Our first incentive on static flops is to check-raise a polarized range of hands – meaning, a range of hands that is clearly delineated as very strong value, or weak bluffs, mostly hands that have backdoor equity at best. The simple reasons for this are twofold:
- These flops don’t connect well enough with our range for us to possess a high frequency of two-pair or better value hands
- Any potential bluffing hands on these flops are unlikely to have good equity, since there simply aren’t any real draws present
If we don’t have a lot of value hands and our bluffs don’t have great equity, we’re simply not going to be able to check-raise anything other than a low frequency, with a polarized range, and probably a larger sizing to reflect that range.
Example: A-9-4 rainbow – on this board we may check-raise all 99 and 44 (assume we’re not flat-calling AA preflop), all A4/A9/94s, and then a mixture of bottom-pair-plus-backdoor hands or low pairs as our bluffs (54/43/33/22). This range has either very strong or very weak equity when called, but it doesn’t waste any middle-strength hands that can easily check-call.
No matter what range we’re defending in the big blind (or calling in the small blind, for that matter), there’s no way for us to possess a range of hands that can bluff a lot on these boards, unless we veer heavily towards exploitative territory and assume our opponent is going to be bet-folding way too often – in which case, we simply check-raise all our weak hands without much calculation.
As a consequence of being forced to bluff less often, we’re bound to be polarized – the nature of the board dictates it. But here’s where it gets complicated…
Incentive #2: Check-raise a merged range
A merged range is a range of hands that contains both a much thinner range of value hands – in the case of a check-raising range, perhaps some one-pair hands as well as two-pair or better – and a wider, more diverse range of bluffs.
A merged raising range is incentivized in situations where our opponent is more likely to continue through a call, and where being re-raised is very unlikely. This is because it’s easier for us to get thinner value from a value hand if we know we’re never going to be forced to make a decision versus a 3-bet, and we also know that all our bluffs are going to at least get to realize half of their current equity by being able to see a turn card for no additional price, if villain never re-raises.
On static flops, the same incentive that causes us to rarely wish to check-raise is one that causes villain to rarely wish to re-raise – there is no incentive for villain to re-raise when our check-raising range is supposed to contain mostly either very strong value hands (which never fold) or very weak bluffing hands (which always fold). It makes our decision very easy.
Villain’s greatest benefit in these instances is through calling our check-raise, and forcing us into an awkward situation with our bluffing hands on the next street. As a result, we’re no longer quite so significantly incentivized to be polarized with our check-raises – in fact, we’re incentivized to be more merged in our raises, to extract thin value from the instances where villain floats our check-raise, thinking we don’t have a lot of value hands to represent.
Example: A-9-4 rainbow – here, if we wanted to check-raise a more merged range, we might add hands like AJ/AT into our range, as well as potentially bluff-raising with some weaker, float-type hands that would usually call. This would include hands like JT/T8/87/65 with backdoor flush draws, as well as any gutshots like 53 or 52 that happened to be in our range. This gives us a greater ability to barrel on the turn, allowing us to extract further thin value with our top end.
This creates a situation where if villain knew we were check-raising a merged range, they would be incentivized to start 3-betting the flop with a very polarized range, to deny equity to our bluffs and apply pressure to our thin value hands. However, if we expected them to respond this way, we would no longer be incentivized to check-raise a merged range, and our switch back to check-raising a polarized range would make their employing a 3-betting range a significant mistake.
Resolving the incentive paradox
There is no easy resolution to this paradox. It’s not really plausible to simply split the difference between the two approaches, and check-raise a little bit thinner for value with a few more bluffs (although this is far from a terrible baseline approach), since at a certain point the number of feasible bluffing hands gets lower and lower on some boards, and we become unbalanced regardless of our attempts to avoid it.
It’s perfectly feasible, however, to eliminate a check-raising range altogether, and against high-level players this can be a very good option – it protects your check-calling range and allows you to get away with folding a few of your weaker defending hands instead of peeling them and folding the turn.
Better still would be to simply shift between approaches according to the context of the game – if villain has seen you check-raise a static board with a strong value hand already, then continue in a more polarized approach and add more bluffs – they may assume you to be stronger than you are.
If you’ve been caught in a bluff on one of these boards, that’s the time to shift to a merged approach, where you continue bluffing, but compensate with much thinner value-bets, to turn your opponent’s response into a mistake while still maintaining balance.
There are numerous responses to every situation, but by clearly outlining our incentives in each spot, as well as recognizing two or more distinct strategies befitting each situation between which we can switch at will, we can give ourselves a better strategic framework within which to operate on a consistent basis.