I received Volumes I and II from amazon and am currently reading Volume I.  I figured this would be a good thread to ask questions about the content.

As many of you know, the book is entirely composed of hand examples with commentary from the author who played the hand.  Later in the book there are collaborative hands. The first section is by PearlJammer, whose style is described as conservative in the early going, minimizing risk and trying to trap opponants, while opening up later on.  I can see why they began with his section, as his style seems the most straightforward of the three authors from the description.

I just read Hand #22 and wonder what you guys think about it (I am quoting from the book):

“Hand 22

Seat1 (SB) t2,210

Seat2 (BB) t4,675

Seat3 t7,810

Seat4 t5,846

Seat5 t7,105

Seat6 t16,660

Seat7 t3,385

Seat8 (PearlJammer) t2910

Seat9 t10,225

Setup:

It is early in a $50 freezeout, and I have played very few pots.  I have close to the starting stack of 3,000.  The blinds are 100-200.

[hole cards] AhJd

Preflop:

(t300) The UTG player in seat 3, who has been fairly active, limps.  The remainder of the table folds around to me.  I could raise to try to take the pot down preflop or perhaps to isolate the limper.  However, this is quite risky, especially given the size of my stack.  To effectively isolate, I would need to raise about one-third of my stack.  If I get any action, it will almost surely be against a better hand, and I might find myself pot committed against a dominating hand.

The UTG limper presents an interesting situation.  If this player had been playing very few pots, I would throw my AJ into the muck as I would be too worried about him limping in with a big pocket pair or a bigger ace.  However, because he has been active, I want to take a flop with him in position.  I choose to limp behind.  The button also limps, the small blinds completes and the big blinds checks.  Five players see the flop.

Flop:

(JcTs3h)(t1000)

I flop top pair with top kicker, a strong but somewhat dangerous hand given two broadway cards on the flop.  The small blind, seat 1, leads out for 800 into a pot of 1000.  The big blind and the UTG limper fold.  Seat 1 has only 1210 left after betting 800, so he is clearly pot committed.  He could have flopped two pair from the small blind or perhaps even a set of threes.  However, most players first to act would try to trap with hands stronger than AJ on this flop, hoping to check raise with so many limpers in the pot.  His most likely holdings here would be a jack with a weaker kicker than mine or a semibluff with an open ended straight draw, KQ, Q9 or 98.  I am confident that I am ahead, so I reraise enough to put Seat 1 all in.  I raise to 2400.

The button folds, and seat 1 calls, showing QJ, (etc. etc.)”

So, I don't understand why it's a good idea to limp for 200 in the cutoff when he only has 2910 to start with.  First of all it doesn't seem so effectively “early” in the tournament as he described it, if the starting stack is 15BB. I suppose there are no antes, but still – he has just under 15BB. After one limper, wouldn't we consider this an easy shove?  No way to get reraised, and honestly why is he suddenly saying he's afraid this UTG limper has such a strong range?  I feel like this isn't the first time he's dealt with an UTG limper, and he even says the guy has been active.  I suppose if he said the guy has been raising every time he opened and now all of a sudden he limps, but he doesn't say that.  He even says that if the guy was less active he would throw his AJ in the muck?

Limp for 200 here?  I was thinking just shove.

Thanks for reading.

Thanks for responding, guys.

Here is one of the last hands from Vol. 1 by PearlJammer, on the bubble, as this volume goes from early game to the bubble.  It makes sense that each author should have some moments to shine, and PJ has shown humility up to this point.

It reads:

______________________________________________________________________________

“Hand 48

Setup:

I am on the bubble of a major Sunday $200 freezout. There are 902 players remaining, and 900 spots are paid.  The blinds are 1,500-3,000 with a 300 ante.  I am not familiar with any players at my table, and I have the chip lead at the table.

Seat 1 (SB) 9,760

Seat 2 (BB) 34,382

Seat 3 22,110

Seat 4 (PearlJammer) 144,070

Seat 5 33,561

Seat 6 17,386

Seat 7 13,730

Seat 8 110,775

Seat 9 117,293

Hole cards: 6s3c

Preflop: (t7,200)

Although this would be a no-brainer fold under normal circumstances, given the bubble situation, I reconsider.  Observe that every player at my table is short stacked except for the cutoff and the button.  If I were opening in late position, I would have to worry about those players playing back at me, but when I raise from ealy position, they will most likely fold anything but premium hands such as TT+, AK and AQ.  Just like the short stacks, the do not want to make a big mistake on the bubble against the one players at the table who has them covered.

If there were less than 900 players left in the tournament, I would not consider raising in this spot, as there are many short stacks that could take a stand with a very wide range of hands.  However, since I am right on the bubble, these short stacks are most likely content to survive until the bubble is burst.  With 7,200 in the pot, and my standard raise of two and a half times the big blind to 7,500 sufficient to take down the pot pre-flop, I am getting such a good return on my steal investment that I should be open raising at every instance where I reasonably expect to win the pot.  I raise to 7,500 and everyone folds.”

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He seems to be making the point that when big stacked on the bubble, you can steal with any two cards if all the factors seem right, even (in this case) when one of those factors is being in early position.  This being written in 2008 and everything aside, my question is – would you guys agree that you can make moves with rags like this if you have a big stack on the bubble?  I'm also assuming he's talking about doing this with a certain kind of rhythm – he didn't say anything about how long he's been at this table except that he's “not familiar with any of the players.”  So is he doing this like almost every time it's folded around to him?  Or does he also need reasons like being suddenlt card dead and for four orbits into the bubble he's been dealt rags, so he will steal every two orbits or something?

Finishing up the Rizen section of this book (Vol 1.) and a few hands near the end bring up questions for me.  His style is described as multi-geared, paying lots of attention to table dynamics and image.  Two hands brought questions about for me.  Here's the first:

__________________________

“Hand 88

Seat 1 (SB): 8,560

Seat 2 (BB): 27,647

Seat 3: 7,824

Seat 4: 15,035

Seat 5: 14,281

Seat 6: 14,528

Seat 7: 17,944

Seat 8 (Rizen): 11,008

Seat 9 (button): 20,598

I am almost at the payout bubble in a nightly $100K tounament with blinds of 300-600 and antes of 30.  This is one of the bigger regular daily tournaments with a mix of good players and satellite qualifiers.  I have an average stack and have been fairly active near the bubble.

Hole cards: KsJc

Preflop: (t1,170)

K-Jo is a solid hand from late position when no one else has entered the pot.  It is folded to me and I make a modest raise to 1,649, which is fairly standard for this stage of the tournament.  It is folded to the big blind, who calls 1,049.

Flop: Ah7c4d (t3,868)

This is a really dry, ace high flop, which is usually perfect for continuation bets.  To my surprise, the big blind bets 1,800.  This is an odd bet in that it is less than half the pot, and he is betting into the pre-flop raiser.  Most opponents will check-raise a real hand in this situation*.  Some sophisticated players will lead with big hands here to trick their opponents, but this player has done nothing to lead me to believe that he is the type of player to make that kind of tricky play.  It is more likely that he has observed how active I've been on the bubble and is trying to push me off my hand, hoping I don't have an ace.

I actually see this move on dry, ace-high boards a lot, both live and online, and against most players you can take the pot here by raising.  A push for a total of 9,359 chips is just a little over a pot sized raise here, which shouldn't seem too suspicious to the original bettor.  I raise all-in to 9,359 and the big blind folds.”

__________________________

My main question is, generally, what do you guys think it is about this situation that makes Rizen so confident that the BB doesn't have an ace?  It seems to me that, especially since the BB is not supposedly so tricky, AX is a very big part of his preflop flatting range.  Obviously in this case Rizen was right, and he's the man.  But how often would you guys make this bluff, for all your chips, over the BB's donk bet?  If the read is wrong, we're all in against the chipleader with only runner-runner to help us.

My second question is about the statement I asterisked (*): Do you guys agree that “Most opponents will check-raise a real hand in this situation” ?

Any thoughts on this section would be appreciated.

Wiz, would you say that this type of situation is one that warrants an all in bluff?

Is folding wrong here?

I ask because I'’m under the impression that we need to be careful about when we go all in on a bluff – that we shouldn't do it without a good reason.  I suppose it being the bubble is a reason .. enough of one?

Thanks Wiz, your responses are very helpful.  I don't consider you a contrarian.

I was wondering just what you said about these types of bluffs. I realize that he's Rizen and he's the man, but I did get the sense that there is usually a lot of specific information that goes into a proper bluff like this, and the information is not easily implanted into a book.

Nonetheless, I'm enjoying reading it, and will continue to post questions here, as long as that doesn't offend the courtroom. It seems a good challenge to decide which parts of a book like this are solid advice, and which parts are more foggy or also outdated.

Here is the other hand in Rizen’s section that I have a question about.  It has a similar feel to the hand I posted above, except he doesn’t go all in, and I’m wondering what he would do if his opponent had acted differently in the end.  I’m posting a slightly paraphrased version this time.

_________________________________________________________________

Hand 99

Setup:

Seat 1 (SB): 15,160

Seat 2 (BB, Villain): 120,637

Seat 6 (Rizen): 66,429

Other stacks range from 18K to 67K, button has 67K

$200 major Sunday tournament, blinds at 1000/2000, 250 ante.  Nearing bubble, lots of satellite players just want to cash.  Table is reasonable but timid. No statement about the big stack in the BB.

Hole cards: AdTh

Preflop: (5,280)

It folds to Rizen, Rizen opens for 5,199, all fold to BB and BB calls.

Flop: (13,648)

Qs7d7c

Rizen now says: “I didn’t hit, but this is the type of flop that isn’t likely to hit my opponent either.  It’s a great board texture to make a continuation bet with.  However, before I get the chance to do so, my opponent bets into me for 8,000.  On this type of board texture with no draws out there, if the big blind really had a queen or a 7, wouldn’t he go for a check-raise?  This is a common misplay by a big stack near the bubble in tournaments with lots of satellite players or other players who aren’t used to playing this deep very often.  They knowthey’re supposed to be using the bubble since they’re the big stack, but they don’t really know how, so they make weird plays like this as bluffs because they’re “supposed to.”  If this were a sophisticated player, he would lead with big hands as well, but nothing to this point has shown me that level of sophistication, so I’ll attack the weakness with what very well might be the best hand and raise to 26,500.  The big blind folds as I reverse the “bubble abuse” he was trying to put on me and use it against him.”

___________________________________________________________________________

We see again that Rizen feels confident that, since this opponent isn’t a tricky player (and he has a read that this is so) he wouldn’t lead into him on this flop with the goods.  So he is confident that his aggression will pay off here.

Two questions:

– Do you have any general comments about this hand?  Is folding on the flop to his 8,000 bet reasonable?  What about floating?  I believe what WizardZur said is true – these books need to be read with a grain of salt.  I won’t try to imitate Rizen every time a hand looks like this, or even ever, but I do want to be able to choose wisely which influences I take from him.   I believe most of what he’s written was very straightforward and helpful.

– What is Rizen’s correct move if the villain comes over the top?  I believe the correct move is to fold because he’s obviously behind and wants to stay in the tournament, but I just want to make sure I’m not missing something about being pot committed at that point.  He has raised 26,500 leaving  ~34,730 behind and the effective pot would be enormous – like 104,000.

Currently reading and enjoying Volume 3.  It's a little short but a good sweat the whole way with 4 pros offering input on 50 hands.  I like the way these guys describe their thought processes and I like that Volume 3 was published in 2012 so it's not too outdated.

I have a question about a remark PearlJammer made in this hand:

“Hand 27, submitted by Matthew Rousu, aka poker_Elmo

Setup: You are in an $11 freezeout with $30K guaranteed [and] a starting field of over 7,200.  You are 3 handed at the final table.

Seat 1: Button: 5,126,217

Seat 3: SB: 9,307,257

Seat 8: Hero, BB: 7,511,526

100,000/200,000 blinds, 25,000 ante

Preflop: Hero holds K8 (t375,000) 

Seat 3 raises to 600,000 and you call.”

About this initial play, PearlJammer says, “The small blind raised three times the big blind and I defended with K-8 off.  Considering the stacks and my position, this is a reasonable play.  Folding would be fine, but three-betting to 1.5 million would be my preferred play, so long as the small blind has not been playing extremely aggressively.”

My question is this – since hero didn't raise to 1.5 million, PearlJammer didn't elaborate on what he would have done if Hero had bet 1.5 million and the SB had in fact gone all in.  Assuming PJ would only do this if the SB was not aggressive, he might have to give SB credit for a hand.  6,000,000 to call  with the effective pot at about 8,175,000, or fold and keep 6,000,000.

Which should he do if this happens?  My guess is that he must fold because 30BB is too much to call with such a middle range hand.  But pot odds are good and it's so late in the tourney that the villain can be so wide ..