Even When They’re Bluffing, They Have A Hand

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One of the most common logic flaws I hear from my students when analysing hands is fairly easy to identify. It usually goes something like this. The villain bets the river and we’re trying to establish whether we should call or not, and the student will say something like:

“This looks strong. I think the villain has a hand. They could have an overpair, they could have a good top pair, a set, maybe two pair…or they could be bluffing.”

This isn’t the worst thought process, but in using the vague phrase, “they could be bluffing”, it ignores the fundamental reality of any given hand of poker – every player in every hand is dealt two hole cards. There’s no getting away from this. What it means is that no matter what stage in a hand we’re at in a hand, if we come to the conclusion that there’s a possibility that the villain is bluffing, we need to think carefully about what his or her bluffing range actually is, and what that means for his or her overall bluffing frequencies. Let’s think about things on a street-by-street basis.

Preflop bluffing ranges

Obviously the earlier we are in a hand, the wider and less well-defined each player’s range is, because they have taken fewer actions in the hand up to that point which give us information to work with. Identifying players’ bluffing ranges preflop – or even identifying whether they have clearly-defined bluffing ranges or not, depending on what kind of player they are – is a key part of formulating a well-balanced preflop strategy.

The first point in a hand at which a player can be bluffing is at the point of the open-raise. They can’t be bluffing if they limp in, since they have no fold equity. However, since there is so much action left to go after the preflop stage of a hand, it’s very difficult to ever define an open-raise as a bluff, per se. It’s more a case of putting players on wider ranges or tighter ranges.

When a player 3-bets, however, they’re probably doing it with a somewhat polarised range that is some parts value, and some parts bluffs, since they now have a greater chance of taking down the pot there and then – they have direct fold equity versus the open-raiser. So if we’re considering a 4-bet, or we’re considering calling a 3-bet, we need to first establish what kinds of hands a player might be inclined to 3-bet bluff with, so that we can choose the best play.

Note that this will not always be the case – some players will 3-bet a linear range, where they’re never outright bluffing but 3-betting a lot wider for value. In any case, whether the villain’s range is polarized or linear, it’s vital that we clarify a range for the player rather than simply defining their range as, say, JJ+, AK, and ‘bluffs’. Their bluffing range could be comprised of mostly suited connector hands, suited Ace-X hands, or even total trash hands like T-4 offsuit or Q-3 offsuit, depending on the spot.

Bluffing ranges on the Flop

The flop is the part of the hand where players’ ranges start to become more well-defined, and we can start to definitively say whether or not a player is bluffing. On a dry flop like K-8-3 or A-7-4, players will often be continuation betting with a lot of hands that haven’t connected with the board. Dependent upon positions and stack sizes, certain boards will hit players’ ranges more than others, obviously, but with good reads on the players at our table, we should be able to make reasonable assumptions about our opponents’ c-betting ranges and tendencies on the flop.

If we decided to just call a continuation bet on this flop, we keep the villain’s range as wide as possible. Dependent upon how they approach double-barrel spots, they’ll probably choose to give up with a lot of their no-equity bluffs – otherwise known as ‘air’ hands – continue bluffing with their draws, and continue value-betting with their strong hands. The ratio of each to the other depends on the board, their preflop range, and many other factors. Their range becomes more defined as the hand goes on, and some of the no-pair hands which might be generically referred to as ‘air’ hands drop out of their range.

Now, let’s say our opponent c-bets a certain flop, and we decide to check-raise, or raise in position, and our opponent calls. Immediately, this should change how we approach the entire remainder of the hand. There’s another simple truth that dictates the way many poker hands play out – a call cannot, in itself, be a bluff. A player can call, or ‘float’ a bet or raise, planning to bluff on later streets, but since a call has no fold equity, we can usually eliminate a large percentage of a player’s ‘pure’ bluffing hands as soon as they have called a bet or raise postflop.

This has significant implications for how we approach future streets, and should make us a lot less likely to include the phrase “or they could be bluffing” in any analysis. The only exception to this is when a villain might flat a raise with a draw, and then that draw misses, in which case the busted-draw hands in their range on later streets might then be considered ‘air’ hands.

Bluffing ranges on the Turn

The turn is where things start to get interesting. We’re now in a situation where if our opponent was the aggressor on the flop and we just called, our opponent can often have a certain range of hands with which he may consider barrelling again as a bluff, as mentioned above. If we find ourselves on a turn card which doesn’t change the board, we need to think carefully about which bluff hands the villain might consider worthy of two barrels – if it’s a blank, rainbow board with no draws, it’s rarely going to be likely that our opponent will fire multiple barrels with a no-equity hand. However, the possibility of a multiple-barrel bluff does still exist, since the villain’s range remains wide, and there are certain hands with which bluffing is the villain’s only chance to win.

Conversely, if our opponent calls a raise or even a check-raise on the flop, their range for getting to the turn is much more likely to include only hands that either have strong drawing equity, or a certain amount of value as a made hand. If we face aggression from a villain on the turn after he or she has called a flop check-raise, which should strongly consider the possibility that he or she simply does not have a bluffing range if there were no significant missed draws on the flop.

If, for example, we make a thin check-raise for value on the flop, get called, and an obvious draw hits the turn, we should consider making a tight fold to any significant aggression, since most the parts of villain’s flop calling range that we were already beating have now hit their draw, and the weaker parts of their flop calling range may be more inclined to get to showdown instead of showing aggression. It simply becomes less likely that villain has any hands in his or her range that actually need to bluff – most of their range has some showdown value.

Bluffing ranges on the River

The river is obviously where equities are polarised in any given hand – one player has the better hand, one player has the worse hand. In a spot where the villain has shown aggression throughout the hand, and we’re faced with the decision as to whether to call a third barrel or not, the villain’s range is extremely polarised – they either have the very strong hand they’re representing, or they have a hand weak enough that it needs to bluff. In many instances with tight players and on many wet boards that hit players’ ranges strongly, ranges will be weighted towards value in these spots. In these instances, their ranges are still polarised, they just don’t really include the weaker end of the spectrum.

In other, more common instances, however, where preflop ranges are wider and the board is a little less clearly-defined, we might find ourselves in spots where we raised or showed aggression on an earlier street, and the villain just called. When we face river aggression in those instances, we do have the advantage of knowing which draws have hit and which draws haven’t. However, one advantage we don’t have is that we’re now put in the position of establishing with our middling hands whether we think the villain can be bluffing or not.

Now, if an obvious draw just missed, then it’s always going to be possible that the villain was holding that draw, and is now left with a nine-high or ten-high hand that needs to bluff in order to win. But if there aren’t many significant draws out there, or if the draws hit, we’re going to need to be able to define the exact, specific hands that the villain could be bluffing with in order to justify calling down with a hand that doesn’t beat much of his value range. Sometimes, we might end up deciding that the villain simply doesn’t have a bluffing range, and end up making a big fold.

An overall approach

The topic of polarised ranges is a complex one that takes a while to get your head around when you first start out. However, it’s pivotal to understanding the concepts of value betting and bluffing, and we can see that the original example statement made at the beginning of this article refers to an instance where the villain’s range is polarised. When this is the case, in order to draw appropriate conclusions about their bluffing frequencies, it’s imperative to consider which hands might actually be in their bluffing range.

The more streets a hand covers, the more well-defined both players’ ranges are. This means that if we’re going to make a statement like the example, we need to be defining exactly which kinds of hands the villain needs to bluff with.

It could be a busted flush draw that flatted a flop check-raise, it could be two overcards they were barrelling off with, it could be a floated gutshot straight draw that turned a double-gutter. But once you get used to this process, you’ll find narrowing players’ ranges easier and easier, and you’ll be able to identify instances where villains’ bluffing ranges are narrowed down to a couple of very specific combo draws, or even nothing at all. These are great spots to exploit your opponents by making big folds, and take advantage of your improved level of specificity with regards to range analysis.